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Introduction
The purpose of the paper is two fold. First, it shall explore the implications of interactions between
evolution in division of labor and evolution in information about the efficient pattern of division of labor
that is acquired by society through the price system for economic growth. Second, we shall develop the
notion of Walrasian sequential equilibrium to model concurrent evolution in division of labor and in
information of organization acquired by society.
Recent development of endogenous growth model, represented by Judd [1985], Romer [1990],
Grossman and Helpman [1989], and Yang and Borland [1991] not only explains economic growth by
endogenous accumulation, but also explains growth by evolution in division of labor which generates
increases in the number of goods and in individuals’ levels of specialization as two aspects of economic
development. The spontaneous evolution in division of labor in the models not only generates growth
phenomena (growth in per capita real income, in productivity, and in per capita consumption) in the absence
of exogenous changes in parameters, but also generates development phenomena, such as increases in
individuals’ levels of specialization, in the number of traded goods, in the degree of market integration, in
the degree of diversification of economic structure, in the number of markets, in income share of transaction
costs, and so on. In contrast, neoclassical growth models, represented by Ramsey [1928], can only generate
evolution in per capita real income or in per capita consumption, although they may generate endogenous
growth in the absence of exogenous changes in parameters, as shown by Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995].
However, evolution in division of labor in the literature of endogenous growth is generated by a
deterministic mechanism based on individuals’ dynamic decisions with infinite horizon. This evolutionary
process involves no uncertainties. As Nelson [1995] points out, real economic growth process is an2
evolutionary process that is featured with uncertainties of the direction of the evolution and with a certain
trend of the evolution. The first purpose of the present paper is to develop an endogenous growth model that
generates an evolutionary process of division of labor, characterized by the two features.
Since productivity depends on the level and pattern of division of labor that is chosen by individuals
while information about the efficient level and pattern of division of labor acquired by society determines
which level and pattern of division of labor will be chosen, the dynamic nature of the information
acquisition is essential for us to understand economic development.  As shown by Yang and Ng [1993], an
individual’s decision on his level and pattern of specialization is always a corner solution. As he changes his
level of specialization, he discontinuously jumps from a corner solution to another corner solution. Hence, a
person can only use total benefit-cost analysis to identify the optimum corner solution after he has
conducted marginal analysis of each corner solution. The discontinuity of decision variables across corner
solutions generates two kinds of complexities. Suppose it takes a period of time for a person to try a corner
solution, then for a given set of prices, a person can sort out the optimum corner solution only after a
sufficiently large number of periods. However, market prices that are available are determined by each and
every individuals’ decisions to choose a certain corner solutions. For instance, no market prices will be
available if all individuals choose an autarkic corner solution that involves no trade (that is, quantities of
traded goods are 0). Hence, individuals’ decisions to choose corner solutions determine what information on
prices is available, while the information determines individuals’ decisions in choosing their levels and
patterns of specialization (or in choosing corner solutions). When time dimension is spelt out, the
interactions between information and dynamic decisions will generate concurrent evolution in information
about the efficient pattern of organization acquired by society and evolution in the level of division of labor
that is chosen by individuals.
An example may illustrate the nature of the information acquisition process. Founding of
McDonald restaurant network can be considered as an experiment with a pattern of high level of division of
labor between specialized production of management and planning and specialized production of direct3
services within the franchise and between specialized production of food and specialized production of
other goods. Since all variables and demand and supply functions are discontinuous from corner solution to
corner solution, marginal analysis based on interior solutions cannot provide the founder of this franchise
with the information for right decision. The founder of McDonald restaurant network decided to use the
market to experiment with his new pattern of business organization that involves a higher level of division
of labor within the franchise and between the franchise and the rest of the economy. Instead of adjusting
prices at the margin, he tried a price of restaurant services that was much lower than the prevailing price of
restaurant services. According to his calculation, the higher level of division of labor would generate
productivity gains, on the one hand, and more transaction costs, on the other. His franchise arrangements
may reduce transaction costs to the extent that the benefit of  the higher level of division of labor outweigh
its cost, so that the substantially lower price of services can stand with the test of the social experiment. This
idea was substantiated later, as we have seen in real world. However, the founder may go to bankruptcy if
the business was proved by the social experiment to be inefficient compared to the prevailing pattern of
organization prior to the experiment. But the social experiment through the price system is necessary for
society to acquire the information about the efficient pattern of division of labor, even if it generates
business failure because of the interdependency between decisions in choosing a pattern of organization and
available information of prices and because of discontinuity of decision variables between different patterns
of division of labor.
Kreps and Wilson’s concept of sequential equilibrium might be a vehicle for analyzing the
interactions between dynamic strategies and information. However, it is a formidable job to endogenize
evolution in division of labor in addition to endogenization of the interactions between dynamic decision
and information using their concept. Usually, even without the endogenization of evolution of division of
labor, only extremely simple models of sequential equilibrium can be solved. Hence, the second purpose of
the paper is to develop the concept of Walrasian sequential equilibrium that makes modeling of endogenous
evolution in division of labor and evolution in information of organization tractable. The concurrent4
evolution in division of labor and in information acquired by society through the price system are based on
adaptive behavior and on limited horizon, so that it is closer to a real economic development process than
what is predicted by Romer [1990] and Yang and Borland’s endogenous growth models [1991] with
spontaneous evolution in division of labor based on perfect information and infinite decision horizon.
Somehow, the present paper bridges the literature of endogenous growth and the literature of bounded
rationality (see Conlisk [1996] for a recent survey on the latter literature).
In the model to be considered, there are many ex ante identical consumer-producers with
preferences for diverse consumption and production functions displaying economies of specialization. 
Complicated interactions between economies of specialization and transaction costs in the market generate
uncertainties about real income for different patterns of division of labor.  Each person's optimal decision is
a corner solution.  Combinations of different corner solutions generate many possible candidates (corner
equilibria) for general equilibrium.  Individuals may experiment with each possible pattern of division of
labor via a Walrasian auction mechanism at a point in time and thereby eliminate uncertainties and acquire
information about the efficient pattern of division of labor over time. However, the costs in discovering
prices generate a tradeoff between information gains and experimentation costs in the information
acquisition process.  A decentralized market will trade off gains from information acquisition against
experimentation costs to determine the equilibrium pattern of experiments with patterns of division of labor
over time.  In the process, individuals use Bayes' rule and dynamic programming to adjust their beliefs and
behavior according to updated information.  Hence, we refer to the solution to the model as Walras
sequential equilibrium.  The determinants of the dynamics of the Walras sequential equilibrium are
transportation cost coefficient for trading one unit of goods, degree of economies of specialization, discount
rate, and pricing cost coefficient.
Suppose the transportation cost coefficient and the degree of economies of specialization are fixed. 
If pricing costs are high, then the market will not experiment with any sophisticated pattern of division of
labor.  If pricing costs are sufficiently low, all possible patterns of division of labor will be experimented5
with.  In this process, simple patterns of division of labor are experimented with before the more
complicated ones are, so that a gradual evolution of division of labor may occur.  If pricing costs are at an
intermediate level, then only simple patterns of division of labor will be experimented with, so that society
cannot acquire all information about the efficient economic organization.  For a fixed pricing cost
coefficient, more patterns of division of labor will be experimented with as the transportation cost
coefficient decreases and/or as the degree of economies of specialization increases.
Our concept of Walras sequential equilibrium is an analogue to Kreps and Wilson's concept of
sequential equilibrium.  In the  game model of Kreps and Wilson [1982], players use dynamic programming
to choose strategies for a given sequence of their beliefs of their opponents' types and the sequence of
beliefs is updated according to the Bayes rule and the observed strategies.  In our model, individuals use
dynamic programming to solve for their experimentation sequence with different patterns of division of
labor for given information of the ranking of each person's incomes generated by various patterns of
specialization.  The information is updated according to the Bayes rule and observed prices.  The difference
between our concept of Walras sequential equilibrium and Kreps and Wilson's concept of sequential
equilibrium will be discussed in section 3.
Compared to Again et al [1991], the result in this paper is more limited to a specific model because
the discontinuity of payoff functions in a general equilibrium model based on corner solutions makes
intractable a model that is as general as Aghion's.  Because of corner solutions and discontinuity of payoff
functions across corner solutions, we assume the absence of information in this paper, while incomplete
information is assumed in Aghion et al.  An experimentation cost in addition to the discount rate is specified
as generated by the process of discovering prices.  By contrast, the experimentation cost in Aghion et al is
generated only by the discount rate.  Finally, our model is a general equilibrium model while Aghion's
model is a partial equilibrium model.  This makes our model more difficult to manage, so that we confine
attention to a specific model where all individuals' decisions on learning by experimenting with the patterns
of economic organization are symmetric.  The symmetry avoids the problem of coordination and mismatch6
in experimentation with various patterns of the division of labor, thereby keeping the model tractable at the
cost of realism.  We leave the analysis of a more realistic model with the coordination problem caused by
information asymmetry, which may generate interesting implications of the role of entrepreneurship in
experiments with economic organization, to future research.
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 specifies an equilibrium model that endogenizes the
determination of the efficient pattern of the division of labor in a Walrasian regime.  Section 2 introduces a
pricing cost and the information problem into the model to generate a story about learning by experimenting
with various patterns of the division of labor.  Section 3 solves for the dynamic equilibrium and discusses
the implications of the results.
1. The Efficient Pattern of Division of Labor in a Walrasian Regime
The model in this section is the same as in Yang [1990].  In the next section, the time dimension and a
fixed pricing cost for possible transactions will be introduced.  There are M ex ante identical consumer-
producers where M is assumed large.  The respective quantities of the three consumer goods self-provided
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(2b) lx +ly +lz = 1, li ˛[0,1],
where li   is a person's labor share in producing good i which is defined as his level of specialization in
producing good i.  This system of production function and endowment constraint displays economies of7
specialization since labor productivity of good i increases with a person's level of specialization in
producing good i.
A Walrasian regime is assumed.  Proposition 1 in Yang [1990], which states that a person sells at
most one good and does not buy and produce the same goods, can also be established for the model in this
paper.  A combination of zero and non-zero variables that is compatible with this proposition is called a
configuration.  There are ten configurations which may be divided into three classes.  The first class is
autarky, denoted by A and shown in Fig 1a where circles represent configurations and lines with arrows
represent flows of goods.  The configurations from the second class are denoted by (i/j).  An individual
choosing (i/j) sells and self-provides good i and buys good j.  He does not buy good i and does not
produce good j.  He self-provides good r „ i, j.  That is, i, i
s , j





=0.  There are six configurations from this class:  (x/y), (y/x), (x/z), (z/x), (y/z), (z/y). Configurations
(x/y) and (y/x) are shown in Fig 1b. The configurations from the third class are denoted by (i/jr) and




d , li > 0 and i
d=j=j
s=r=r
s=lj=lr=0.  There are three configurations from this class: 
(x/yz), (y/xz), (z/xy).8
A combination of configurations that is compatible with the market clearing conditions is called a
market structure or simply a structure.  There are five structures derived from feasible combinations of
the ten configurations.  Autarky itself is a structure.  Hence, a corner solution for A is a corner
equilibrium.  Three market structures are referred to as partial division of labor with goods i and j traded
and denoted by P(ij).  P(ij) consists of configurations (i/j) and (j/i). P(xy) is shown in Fig 1b. Finally,
market structure C, the complete division of labor shown in Fig 1c,  consists of configurations (x/yz),
(y/xz), and (z/xy).  The market clearing and utility equalization conditions determine a corner equilibrium
for each market structure with trade.
Following Yang and Ng [1993, chapter 6], it can be shown that the Walrasian equilibrium is the
corner equilibrium that generates the highest per capita real income.  Following the two-step approach to
solving for equilibrium based on corner solutions, developed in Yang [1990], the following lemma has
been established in Appendix A, which is available from the first author upon reqest. It is shown in Yang
[1990] that only market structure P(xy) out of the three market structures with the partial division of labor
Figure 1: Endogenous Evolution of the Division of Labor Based on Experiments with
Patterns of the Division of Labor9
is the equilibrium and P(xz) and P(yz) cannot be the equilibrium when two goods are traded if a>b>g.























(1) Assume that k2>k1
The equilibrium is autarky (A) if transaction efficiency k<k1.  The equilibrium is the partial
division of labor (P) where the relative price of the traded goods is py/px=
(2a a)
a a(2b b+g g)
b b+.5g g/(2b b)
b b(2a a+g g)
a a+.5g g and the relative number of different specialists is My/Mx=
(2a a+g g)/(2a a+g g)]
.5g g if k˛ ˛(k1,k2).  The equilibrium is the complete division of labor (C) where
px=py=pz and Mx=My=Mz, if k>k2.
(2) Assume that k2<k1
The equilibrium is autarky if transaction efficiency k<k3.  The equilibrium is the complete
division of labor if k>k3.  The partial division of labor can never be an equilibrium.  The
partial division of labor generates a greater value of per capita real income than autarky iff
k>k1.10
2. Costs in Acquiring Information about the Efficient Pattern of the Division of Labor
In this section, a time dimension is introduced into the model.  The decision horizon of an individual is
assumed to be limited and discrete.  There are three periods for an individual's decision problem.  It is
assumed that in period 0, M individuals are in autarky.  They must decide which market structure, among
autarky, partial division of labor, and complete division of labor, to experiment with in each of periods 1, 2,
3.  For this dynamic model, it is possible that individuals experiment with one of several corner equilibria
via a Walrasian auction mechanism over each period.
Individuals may find the corner equilibrium that maximizes their real income if they have
experimented with all market structures through such a Walrasian pricing mechanism.  In this section we
will specify the dynamic model.  Then, the next section solves for the dynamic equilibrium which
determines the experimentation pattern as a function of the parameters of pricing efficiency, transportation
efficiency, the degree of economies of specialization, and the discount factor.
Suppose that the utility function and the system of production for each consumer-producer are the
same as in the preceding section, independent of time.  It is further assumed that a fraction, 1-s, of an
individual's expected utility disappears because of pricing costs in the experiment with the transactions in
one corner equilibrium in a period, but no pricing costs are incurred for the similar transactions in
subsequent periods. In a Walrasian regime, a Walrasian pricing mechanism sorts out relative prices of
traded goods through communications between the Walrasian auctioneer and each individual in a
tatonnement process. The pricing cost is incurred in the communication process. Note that an exchange of
good x for good y in structure P is considered to be different from an exchange of good x for good y in
structure C since the relative price of the goods may differ between the two market structures.  Assume
further that a person can choose at most one configuration involving trade in any period and thereby society
can experiment at most with one market structure in each period. Also, as soon as individuals have found
the relative prices in a corner equilibrium, they can instantly choose between this structure and those which11
had been previously experimented with. For instance, if individuals have experimented with structure P in
period 1, then they can immediately choose whichever is better between structures A and P in the end of
period 1. Suppose that the pricing cost coefficient, which is equivalent to an experimentation cost
coefficient of a structure, is infinitesimally smaller for structure P than that for structure C because each
person must find the relative prices of three traded goods in C, but only the relative price of two traded
goods in P.
In period 0, each individual has information on autarky, but has no information about other
individuals' parameters of preference, production function, and endowments and about relative prices in
market structure P or C.  Therefore, they cannot obtain complete information about economic organization
unless they have experimented with the other two market structures. The assumption that all individuals
have no information of the relative prices in market structures P and C implies that they have no information
about their real incomes in the two market structures.  This assumption of the absence of information differs
from the assumption of incomplete information.  For the assumption of incomplete information, a person
knows the distribution function of his real income in market structure P or C.  For the assumption of the
absence of information, a person does not know such a distribution function.  What he knows is that the
ranking of real income in structures A, P, and C is subject to a certain distribution.
An individual's information set in period 0 is specified as follows.  He knows that three types of
configurations may generate three levels of real income.  Let the per capita real income in autarky be uA,
that in the partial division of labor be uP, and that in the complete division of labor be uC.  Each individual
knows the real value of uA, but does not know the real values of uP and uC.  Nor does he know the
distribution functions of uP and uC.  Signifying the ranking of real income by the order of letters, there are
six possible rankings of per capita real income:  uAuPuC, uAuCuP, uPuAuC, uPuCuA, uCuAuP, uCuPuA. For
instance, uPuAuC implies that structure P generates the highest per capita real income, structure C generates
the lowest per capita real income, and structure A generates an intermediate level of per capita real income.
Suppose that in period 0 each individual knows that the difference between the two consecutive levels of per12
capita real income generated by the three structures is b. Each individual's subjective distribution density is
that each state occurs with probability 1/6. Since real value of b depends on the degree of economies of
specialization, he estimates b according to the following rule. Let parameter of the degree be a, then
a=(a,b,g). Assume a person’s prior knowledge of the relationship between b and a is b=fi(a). fi(.) depends on
the ranking of real incomes generated by the three structure. Suppose b=f1(a) for ranking uAuPuC. For this
ranking, a lower level of division of labor generates a higher level of per capita real income. But an increase
in the degree of economies of specialization, a, will increase per capita real income in a structure with a
higher level of division of labor thereby reducing the difference between consecutive levels of real incomes,
b. Hence, df1/da < 0. Suppose b=f2(a) for ranking uAuCuP, b=f3(a) for ranking uPuAuC, b=f4(a) for ranking
uPuCuA, b=f5(a) for ranking uCuAuP, and b=f6(a) for ranking uCuPuA. Following the same logic for proving
df1/da < 0, it can be shown that df2/da < 0 between structures A and C and df2/da > 0 between structure C
and P; df3/da > 0 between structures P and A and df3/da < 0 between structure A and C; df4/da < 0 between
structures P and C and df4/da > 0 between structure C and A; df5/da > 0 between structures C and A and
df5/da < 0 between structure A and P; df6/da > 0. Since each of the 6 rankings takes place with equal
probability, the estimate of b at t=0 is
(3a) (1/6)￿i fi(a).
We define this "information set" to be characterized by the absence of information because the expected
value of uP (or uC) equals uA, which implies that a person does not know more than real value of uA, and the
entropy of the system with the six states is at its maximum, which implies that the information that a person
has is at its minimum.  The expected value of uP (or uC ) is (1/3)[(uA +b)+(uA -b)]+(1/6)[(uA +2b)+(uA -2b)] =
uA .  The entropy of the system with six states is -6(1/6)log2(1/6) = 2.5850 bits that is the maximum level of
entropy for a system with six states.
1
                                          
    
1 Entropy is maximized when each and every state occurs with equal probability.  Maximum entropy implies
minimum information.13
As soon as any one of structures P and C is experimented with, a person’s knowledge of b is
updated according to the Bayes law and the observed difference |uA-uP| or |uA-uC| which is dependent on the
parameters of production, transactions, and tastes. For instance, if a person decides to try structure P in
period 1 and he finds uA>uP after he has seen prices in structure P and has calculated his utility according to
the prices. Then at the end of period 1, uPuAuC, uPuCuA, and uCuPuA are ruled out according to the Bayes rule
since the three rankings are incompatible with uA>uP. Suppose the observed difference between uA and uP is
b’ and each individual still believes that true b is the same between consecutive real income levels. Then b’
equals b with conditional probability 2/3 since uAuPuC takes place with probability 1/3 and uCuAuP takes
place with probability 1/3 after a person has seen b’ =uA-uP >0, while uA-uP =b for the 2 rankings. Also, b’
equals 2b with conditional probability 1/3 since uAuCuP takes place with probability 1/3 after a person has
seen b’ =uA-uP >0, while uA-uC=uC-uP=b=(1/2)(uA-uP)=(1/2)b’ for this ranking. Therefore, the expected value
of b is (2/3)b’+(1/3)2b’=5b’/6 after a person has seen b’ =uA-uP >0.
With the knowledge about b and rankings of per capita real incomes in different structures, each
individual can calculate his expected real income in order to make a decision on the optimal pattern of
experiments with market structures.  He has chosen an experimentation pattern even if he stays with autarky
forever.  This special pattern of experimentation with organization can be denoted AAAA, that is, the initial
state is structure A and A is chosen in periods 1, 2, and 3.  If an individual chooses configuration (i/j) in
period 1 and (i/jr) in period 2 and stays with the one that generates the highest real income among the three
configurations, then structure P will be experimented with in period 1 and structure C will be experimented
with in period 2.  Here there is no difficulty for individuals to match each other's choices of configurations
for two reasons.  First, each person's objective function, specified in (4) below, is affected only by the
difference in the number of traded goods. The difference between (i/j) and (j/i) or between (i/jr) and (j/ir), or
(r/ij) has no effect on each person's real income because of the utility equalization condition. Due to the
same discount rate, the same information, and the same pricing cost coefficient for all individuals, players
will choose the same number of traded goods and they have no difficulty in coordinating the choice of the14
same number of traded goods.  This implies that if a person chooses configuration (i/j) in period 1, then
nobody will choose (i/jr) in the same period.
Second, players will not have difficulties in matching each other's choice of different occupations
(configurations) as soon as they participate in the Walrasian auction mechanism in a certain period after
they have chosen the pattern of experimentation sequence.  Appendix A, available upon request, shows that
the indirect utility function of a specialist producer of good i increases with the price of good i in terms of
other goods.  The market clearing condition implies that the price of good i in terms of good j is inversely
related to the number of specialist producers of good i relative to those of good j.  Hence, when the number
of specialists of a good is small, the price of this good will be high, so that the utility level of the specialists
will be high.  Thus, individuals have incentives to choose this profession.  This implies that a person has an
incentive to choose configuration (i/j) if other individuals choose (j/i).
In the absence of mismatch, market structure P will be chosen if an individual chooses
configuration (i/j) and market structure C will be chosen if an individual chooses configuration (i/jr).  If
structure P is experimented with in period 1, then the Walrasian relative prices in structure P will be
ascertained via a Walrasian auction mechanism. As soon as the corner equilibrium relative price in structure
P is ascertained in period 1, each individual can calculate his real income in structure P.  He will choose
autarky if uA >uP .  Otherwise he will choose structure P.  Denoting an expectation formed in period t by Et ,
the utility level in period t expected in period t for option i(t) can be expressed as Et [ut (i)], where i = A, P,
C.
2  In period 0 a person expects that he will receive utility E0 [u1 (P)] in period 1 if he chooses P in period 1.
 If the pricing cost, the discount factor, and what a person knows in period 0 are taken into account, in
period 0 he expects his real income for period 1 to be
(3b) E0 [u1 (P)]=sr[(1/2)uA +(1/3)(uA +b)+(1/6)(uA +2b)]=sr(uA +2b/3)
                                          
    
2 It can be assumed that in a period individuals have to choose the structure tried in that period even if they
have found out it inferior to the structure previously chosen and that they can return back to the better
previous structure only in the next period. This assumption will substantially complicate the algebra, but
contribute little to the explaining power of the model.15
where he decides to choose configuration (i/j) in period 1.  Here s is the fraction of expected real income
that has been received.  The fraction 1-s is assumed to disappear because of pricing cost. 1-s is a person's
fixed communication cost with the Walrasian auctioneer. The cost is necessary for sorting out the relative
prices in the structure concerned and is independent of quantities to trade. The discount factor r is
between 0 and 1.  The probability for uA to be Max{uA , uP } is .5 because uAuPuC occurs with probability
1/6 and so does uA uC uP or uC uA uP .  Hence, if a person chooses the structure that generates the highest
real income to him after the experiment with structure P, he receives uA with probability .5.  He receives
uA +b with probability 1/3 because uP uA uC occurs with probability 1/6 and so does uC uP uA and because
the difference between two consecutive levels of real income is b.  He receives uA +2b with probability
1/6 because uPuCuA occurs with probability 1/6 and the maximum difference between two levels of real
income is 2b.  Note that a person knows uA  but does not know the values of uP and uC in period 0. He
uses (3a) to estimate b at t=0.
From (3b) a tradeoff exists between potential gains arising from information generated by
experiments and pricing costs incurred in such experiments.  Without the experiment with structure P in
period 1, a person receives ruA in period 1.  He expects to receive a higher discounted real income r(uA
+2b/3) if he experiments with structure P at the cost (1-s)r(uA +2b/3).  However, such experimentation
costs are incurred only once.  If he does not experiment with structure C in periods 2 and 3, he can
receive expected discounted real income r
2 (uA +2b/3) in period 2 and r
3 (uA +2b/3) in period 3 without
experimentation costs.  If he experiments with structure C in period 2, he expects to receive sr
2 (uA +b) in
period 2 and r
3 (uA +b) in period 3.  The pricing cost coefficient 1-s can be interpreted as an investment in
acquisition of information regarding organization.  It generates perpetual benefits at the cost of current
consumption.  Current real income decreases because of the experimentation costs but the discounted
future real income increases because of the perpetual benefits generated by the experiments.   Hence, this
tradeoff between preferences for current real income over future income, represented by the discount16
factor, and gains to information regarding organization is similar to the conventional tradeoff between the
preference for current consumption and the productivity gains to investment.
If a structure with trade is experimented with in period 1, then individuals will sort out the
relative prices of traded goods and relative numbers of individuals choosing different configurations
through a Walrasian auction mechanism.  Using the updated information, each individual can calculate his
real income in the structure and decide if he implements the transactions.  Since the values of the relative
prices and relative numbers of different specialists in the corner equilibria are the same for all individuals,
the updated information is the same for all individuals.  Using the Bayes rule, each individual updates his
beliefs of ranking of utilities in different structures and adjusts his dynamic decision of further
experimentation with the structures that have not been experimented with.  The utility equalization
condition in each corner equilibrium implies that all individuals' adjustment of dynamic decisions based
on the updated beliefs are consistent with one another.  Hence, no coordination problem exists.
3. Information Costs and Endogenous Evolution of the Division of Labor
The concept of Walras sequential equilibrium is defined and an individual's dynamic programming
problem in period 0 is specified and solved in subsection 3.1. In subsection 3.2 an individual's dynamic
programming problems in other periods are solved using the Bayes rule. The Walras sequential
equilibrium is then solved.
3.1 Pattern of Experiment with Organization in Period 0
Sequential equilibrium is defined as a fixed point which satisfies the following conditions.  (1) In each
period each individual maximizes his total discounted utility with respect to the sequence of configurations17
and quantities of goods produced, consumed, and traded for given history of the system and his
information in this period; (2) Each individual's information is updated on the basis of observed prices,
using Bayes' rule; and (3) A sequence of relative number of individuals who choose different
configurations and a sequence of relative prices of all traded goods clear the markets for goods and
equalize utilities across individuals in each period. The difference between the concept of Walras
sequential equilibrium and Kreps and Wilson's concept of sequential equilibrium is that (i) our sequential
equilibrium consists of several Walrasian static equilibria over periods and (ii) in each period, each
individual has a dynamic programming problem over subsequent periods which might be different from
his dynamic programming problem in the next period because of adaptive decisions to updated
information. The difference (i) implies that in Kreps and Wilson's sequential equilibrium, there are direct
interactions between individuals' strategies and information while in our sequential equilibrium
interactions between information and individuals' decisions take place indirectly through a sequence of
Walrasian equilibria which are fixed points determined by the interactions between prices and quantities
over several periods. If information asymmetry is introduced into our model, a coordination problem will
generate a story which is more like the story based on Kreps and Wilson's concept of sequential
equilibrium.
An individual's dynamic decision problem in period 0 can be represented by a dynamic
programming problem that is illustrated in Figure 2.  Nodes in Figure 2 denote the options available to an
individual.  An option can be either a structure that an individual can choose to experiment with or a
pattern of experiment.  In period 1, an individual can choose one out of A (staying with autarky), P
(experimenting with structure P and choosing the best among all structures that have been experimented
with), and C (experimenting with structure C and choosing the best between all structures that have been
experimented with).  The payoff generated by an option is denoted by the letters above the line that leads18
to the option in the next period.  For instance, option A in period 1 generates utility u”uA, option P in
period 2 generates discounted utility srv”sr(uA+2b/3).
This system remembers whatever happened before.  Thus, the options available in period 2 are
more numerous than in period 1.  Options A, P, and C in period 2 are the same as in period 1.  Node PO
denotes the option that a person experiments with structure P in period 1 and no new experiment in period
2 when he stays with the best between A and P.  Node CO denotes the option that a person experiments
with structure C in period 1 and no new experiment in period 2 when he stays with the best between A
and C.  A sequence of option P in period 1 and C in period 2 implies that a person is informed about
relative prices in all corner equilibria.  Following the procedure for calculating E0[u1(P)], given by
equation (3b), the expected discounted real income for option C in period 2 following P in period 1 is sr
2
(uA +b).  The two further options PO and CO in period 2 that are distinctive from any options available in
period 1, underline the fact that payoffs depend not only upon current options, but also upon the time path
of decisions in the past.  Such an option generates discounted expected real income in period 2, r
2 (uA
+2b/3), which differs from that generated by option C in period 2, sr
2 (uA +b).  A person will not
experiment with a structure that has been experimented with previously due to the perpetual value of
information on organization.  Hence, a person will experiment with structure C in a given period only if
he has not previously experimented with that structure.
Options A, P, C, PO, and CO in period 3 are the same as in period 2.  However, there is one
more option PCO available in period 3 because payoffs depend on the decision path.  Option PCO
denotes that a person has experimented with structures P and C and stays in period 3 with the best among
A, P, and C.  Therefore, there are six terminal points in period 3.  Payoffs associated with a certain
option are indicated above the line leading to the corresponding node in Figure 2.









































Figure 2:  Dynamic Programming Problem20
where u ” uA , v ” uA + 2b/3, w ” uA + b.
Figure 2 provides an intuitive illustration of the payoffs for different options in the three periods.
Applying the Bellman optimality principle, a backward decision rule yields the solution to the
dynamic programming problem in period 0.  This solution is summarized in Table 1.  The technical detail
of the derivation of the solution is in Appendix B, which is available upon request.  Due to the same
information, same discount rate, and same pricing cost coefficient, which is slightly larger for structure C
than for structure P, for all individuals, individuals' dynamic decisions on optimal patterns of experiments
with organization are symmetric.  Hence, all individuals will experiment with the same market structure
in each period.
Table 1:  Solution of the Dynamic Programming Problem in Period 0
s<s0 s˛(s0,s1) s>s1
AAAA APOO APCO
where s0”[uA+2br(1+r)/3]/(uA+2b/3), s1”[uA+b(2-r)/3]/(uA+b), and s1>s0.
In Table 1 pattern AAAA denotes autarky from period 0 to period 3.  Pattern APOO denotes
autarky in period 0, an experiment with the partial division of labor in period 1, and the best between A
and P being chosen in periods 1, 2, 3. Pattern APCO denotes autarky in period 0, an experiment with P
in period 1, an experiment with C in period 2, the best between A and P being chosen in period 1, and the
best among A, P, and C being chosen in periods 2 and 3. Table 1 shows that individuals will stay with
autarky forever and to undertake no experiments with structure P or C if pricing efficiency s<s0.  One
structure involving trade will be experimented with and the best between A and that structure will be
chosen in period 1 if s˛(s0 ,s1). Two structures involving trade will be experimented with over periods 1
and 2 and the best among A and them will be chosen if s>s121
3.2 Walras sequential equilibrium
Now, suppose s>s0, then structure P will be experimented with in period 1.  Hence, uncertainties about
value of uP and about the ranking of uA and uP are solved after the relative price px/py and relative number
Mx/My are sorted out by the Walrasian auction mechanism.  With the updated information, each
individual knows uP>uA iff k>k1.  Assume k>k1, then each person's updated information based on
Bayes' rule in period 1 is: uP>uA for certain; ranking uPuAuC, uPuCuA, or uCuPuA occurs with probability
1/3. Also, updated estimate of b can be calculated according to observed uP - uA and the Bayes rule. On
the basis of the updated information, each person can specify a dynamic programming problem from
period 1 to period 3, which is analogous to the one in (4).  For k<k1 or other values of k, similar but
different problems can be specified.  Following an analogous backward decision rule, the dynamic
programming problems can be solved. The solution to each individual's all dynamic programming
problems in periods 0, 1, and 2, together with the corner equilibrium relative prices of traded goods and
relative numbers of different specialists in relevant structures, determine the Walras sequential
equilibrium.  Which sequence of structure is associated with the sequential equilibrium depends upon the
values of the parameters of transportation efficiency, pricing efficiency, degree of economies of
specialization, and discount factor.  The sequential equilibrium and its comparative dynamics are
summarized in Fig. 3.  The corresponding sequential equilibrium relative prices and relative numbers of
different specialists can be found from lemma 1.22
Figure 3:  The Sequential Equilibrium
           Period 0                      Period 1                Period 2                  Period 3
where the capitalized letters in brackets represent the structures that have been experimented with in a
certain period and those without brackets represent the structures that have been chosen.






















(5) s3>s2 iff k>k1.
From Fig. 3 we can see that if k is fixed such that k<k3, then no structure with trade will be
experimented with and no information will be acquired by society for s<s0. Structure P will be
experimented with in period 1 but autarky will be finally chosen over all periods if s˛(s0,s2). Hence,
partial information will be acquired by society. Structure P will be experimented with in period 1 and
structure C will be experimented with in period 2 but autarky will be finally chosen over all periods if
s>s2. All information of relative price, relative numbers of different specialists, and real incomes for
structures P and C which are given in lemma 1 are learned by individuals over the three periods despite23
the fact that P and C are not finally chosen. This implies that more structures will be experimented with as
pricing efficiency s increases for a fixed transportation efficiency k.
Fig. 3 indicates also that if s is fixed such that s˛(s3,s2) for k<k1 or s>s3 for k>k1, then only
structure P is experimented with in period 1 and autarky is finally chosen over all periods if k<k1;
structure P will be experimented with in period 1 and C will be experimented with in period 2 and P will
be finally chosen over period 1 and C will be chosen over periods 2 and 3 if k>k1.
3 This implies that for
a fixed value of pricing efficiency that is not too small, more structures will be experimented with and a
higher level of division of labor will be finally chosen as transportation efficiency increases (for fixed
values of a, b, and g). Since ki decrease with a, b, and g, this implies that more structures will be
experimented with and a higher level of division of labor will be finally chosen as the degree of
economies of specialization, a, b, or g increases if transportation efficiency k is fixed. Since s2 and s3
decrease with r, more structures will be experimented with as the discount factor increases (or as the
discount rate decreases) if other parameters are fixed.
For s>s3 and k>k1, sequential equilibrium involves gradual evolution of division of labor from
autarky in period 0 first to partial division of labor in period 1, finally ending up with complete division of
labor in periods 2 and 3. All individuals have gradually learnt and implemented all prices and real
incomes generated by various patterns of division of labor. The concurrent evolution of division of labor
and information will generate progress in productivity as well as many other structural changes.  The
concurrent evolution of productivity and the division of labor may occur due to the information gains
from learning by experimentation with different patterns of the division of labor even in the absence of
learning by producing goods that was specified in Yang and Borland [1991]. It is interesting to note the
following feature of the concurrent evolution. Individuals did not know where the system head for at t=0.
                                          
    
3 Here, we have used the facts based on (5) that s2<s3 and thereby s˛(s3,s2) is impossible if k>k1 and that
s2>s3 and thereby s˛(s3,s2) is possible if k<k1.24
They gradually learn the direction of the evolution as they use adaptive decision rule to resolve
uncertainties. Despite of the uncertainties of the direction of the evolution, it displays a trend from simple
to complex patterns of division of labor. The adaptive behavior, uncertainties of the direction of
evolution, and a certain trend of the evolution distinguish our endogenous growth from deterministic
endogenous growth models of Judd, Romer, Grossman-Helpman, and Yang-Borland.
The algebra for establishing the results in Fig. 3 is in Appendix B, available upon request. The
results yield the following proposition.
Proposition 1
Autarky is chosen over all periods and no experiments with organizational patterns will take
place and therefore no information about economic organization can be acquired by society
if pricing efficiency s is too low and/or the discount rate is too large.  All market structures
will be experimented with and society will acquire complete information about economic
organization via the price system if pricing efficiency, transportation efficiency, the degree
of economies of specialization and the discount factor are sufficiently large. More market
structures will be experimented with, more information of organization will be acquired,
and a higher level of division of labor will be finally chosen as pricing efficiency,
transportation efficiency, the degree of economies of specialization, and/or discount factor
increase. If pricing efficiency, transportation efficiency, and the degree of economies of
specialization are sufficiently large, a gradual evolution of the division of labor and
productivity will take place.
In terms of terminology in Aghion et al [1991], this proposition identifies the conditions under
which adequate learning will or will not occur.  However, the difference is that the condition for adequate25
social learning to occur in our model is a sufficiently high pricing efficiency and a sufficiently low
discount rate, while it is in Aghion et al that the payoff function is analytical or is smooth and quasi-
concave or the discount rate is zero.
Figure 1 gives an intuitive illustration of the evolution of the division of labor.  In period 0,
individuals are in autarky, as shown in panel (a), where there are no markets or trade, and productivity is
low because economies of specialization cannot be exploited.  For sufficiently great pricing efficiency,
transportation efficiency, and degree of economies of specialization, the partial division of labor
illustrated in panel (b) will be experimented with and chosen in period 1.  There are two markets, and
hence each person must undertake two transactions to obtain all necessary goods.  Each individual sells
one good, self-provides two goods, and trades two goods.  The degree of production concentration is
higher than in autarky.  Each individual's level of specialization is higher than in autarky. The number of
distinct professional sectors (configurations) is two.  This implies that the economic structure where each
individual has a higher level of specialization is more diverse than in autarky, that is, specialization and
diversification are two sides of the division of labor.
Finally, the complete division of labor will be experimented with and will be chosen in period 2. 
Trade dependence, productivity, the number of traded goods, the number of markets, the diversity of the
economic structure, production concentration, and the level of specialization for each person are all higher
than in the partial division of labor.  In particular, the size of the market network and the  degree of
integration of the market increase as the division of labor evolves over time.
For the model presented in this paper a gradual evolution of the division of labor will not occur in
the absence of experimentation costs of economic organization if k2<k1.  Individuals will either jump to
the complete division of labor and stay there forever (if k>k2) or remain in autarky forever (if k<k2). 
The experimentation costs of economic organization restrain individuals from obtaining all information
about economic organization within a single period, and therefore it takes time for people to experiment26
with all possible patterns of the division of labor and to obtain complete information regarding economic
organization.  In this process, a gradual evolution of the division of labor will be observed even if the
complete division of labor given perfect information is most efficient.
The essence of the model presented in this paper is that knowledge of economic organization
determines productivity and technical conditions.  Suppose k>k2, then the production possibility frontier
and the welfare frontier are associated with the complete division of labor.  However, due to pricing costs
and the lack of information about organization an economy may remain in autarky forever if pricing
efficiency (i.e. experimentation efficiency) and/or the discount factor are sufficiently small.  This point
becomes even more evident if many goods are introduced into the model such that the number of patterns
of the division of labor and the number of experimentation patterns are increased.  In this case the number
of periods that is necessary for experimenting with all possible patterns of the division of labor will
increase more than proportionally.  For a completely symmetric model, the number of possible distinctive





m if n out
of m goods are traded and preference and production parameters differ across goods, where C
n
m is n
combination of m factors.  Suppose there are 100 goods (m=100) and it takes one day for an economy to
experiment with one pattern of the division of labor.  It will take 2
100/365»3.34·10
27 years to have
experimented with all patterns of the division of labor.  This indicates the significant implications of the
information costs of organization for economic growth.
This theory can be used to tell the following story.  Several thousand years ago, if people had had
a very developed division of labor and a right pattern of the division of labor, they could have developed
modern technology by employing gains arising from the sophisticated division of labor within a relatively
short period of time.  However, they failed to achieve this not just because of a technical constraint, but
also because of the lack of information about the efficient pattern of the division of labor that may
generate advanced technology.  If this story makes sense, then we can see how substantial is the27
information cost of organization.  This cost constrained people to a low level of productivity for several
thousand years.  That is, it took such a long time for people to experiment with sufficiently many patterns
of the division of labor that they were not able to find the efficient one until the Industrial Revolution in
Britain during the eighteenth century.
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown that the price system is a way to coordinate experiments with economic
organization.  The price system does not convey all information about efficient organization if all possible
patterns of organization have not been experimented with.  As long as pricing costs are not trivial and
people are short of information about the efficient pattern of the division of labor, the most efficient
pattern of organization may not be experimented with and therefore may not be found out in a dynamic
equilibrium based on rational behavior in the absence of information.  A certain irrational behavior based
on limited information may increase the chance for experiments with all possible patterns of organization
including efficient as well as inefficient ones.  The seemingly irrational experiments with inefficient
patterns of organization are necessary for identifying the efficient pattern from the inefficient ones.
An increase in pricing efficiency s or transportation efficiency k may increase a chance for more
patterns of organization to be experimented with.  Institutional arrangements, urbanization, the legal
system, government policies, and technical conditions for transactions, all affect pricing efficiency in
experiments with patterns of economic organization and thereby determines productivity and welfare. 
The angle from which we approach the informational role of prices differs from one through which
Grossman [1989] approaches this issue.  He has shown that the price system works in a way that it seems
to convey all information to everybody.  We have shown that the price system may not carry all
information about economic organization if experiments with organization have not exhausted all possible28
patterns of organization.  The price system is only a vehicle for individuals to coordinate experiments with
organization that are necessary for acquiring information about the efficient pattern of the division of
labor.
The other implication of our model for development economics is that it can be used to explain a
big jump (rather than a big push) in the industrialization process in a less developed country.
4  A less
developed country as a newcomer in the industrialization process can always obtain free information on
the efficient pattern of the division of labor.  He can mimic the organizational pattern that has been proven
to be efficient via the experiments with organizational patterns in developed countries. Hence, a gradual
evolution of the division of labor is no longer efficient for newcomers.  A big jump industrialization to a
very high level of division of labor from autarky is possible.  In terms of our model in section 2 if k>k2,
a newcomer can jump, over structure P, to structure C from autarky, if other countries have already
experimented with P and C.
5
Our story here is consistent with Young's idea [1928] that savings and investments are not a
matter of available resources and technology, but rather they are a matter of the evolution of the division
of labor.  In our model, the experimentation cost is a sort of investment in acquiring the information about
the efficient pattern of division of labor that determines productivity and technical progress.
                                          
    
4 Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989a, b) have developed some formal models to explain big push
industrialization by some factors other than low information costs for a newcomer.
    
5 It is unrealistic to attribute all obstacles for economic growth to experimentation cost of organization because
we can find many less developed countries which cannot exploit information provided by organizational
experiments in developed economies. If learning by doing specified in Yang and Borland [1991] is
introduced into the current model with learning by experimenting with organization, then a blend of the two
kinds of learning may yield a more realistic story.29
References
Aghion, P., Bolton, P., and Jullien, B. (1991):  "Optimal Learning by Experimentation", Review of
Economic Studies, 58: 621-54.
Barro, T. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (1995): Economic Growth, New York, McGraw-Hill.
Conlisk, John (1996), “Why Bounded Rationality?” The Journal of Economic Literature, 34, 669-700.
Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (1989), "Product Development and International Trade", Journal of Political
Economy, 97, 1261-83.
Grossman, S. (1989):  The Informational Role of Prices, MIT Press.
Kreps, D. and Wilson, R. (1982):  "Sequential Equilibria", Econometrica, 50: 863-94.
Murphy, K., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1989a):  "Industrialization and the Big Push", Journal of
Political Economy, 97: 1003-26.
-------- (1989b):  "Income Distribution, Market Size, and Industrialization", The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 104, August, 537-564.
Nelson, R. (1995), "Recent Evolutionary Theorizing About Economic Change", Journal of Economics
Litureture, 33, 48-90.
Ramsey (1928), "A Mathematical Theory of Saving", Economic Journal, 38, 543-59.
Romer, P. (1990), "Endogenous Technological Change", Journal of Political Economy, 98, S71-S102.
Smith, Adam (1776):  An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.  Reprint, edited by
E. Cannan.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1976.
Yang, X. (1990):  "Development, Structural Changes, and Urbanization".  Journal of Development
Economics, 34: 199-222.
Yang, X. and Borland, J. (1991):  "A Microeconomic Mechanism for Economic Growth".  Journal of
Political Economy, 99: 460-82.
Yang, X. and Ng, Y-K. (1993):  Specialization and Economic Organization, a New Classical
Microeconomic Framework, Amsterdam, North-Holland.
Yang, X. and Ng, S. (1997): "Specialization and Division of Labor: A Survey," in K. Arrow, Y-K. Ng,
and X. Yang eds. "Increasing Returns and Economic Analysis," London, Mcmillian.
Young, A. (1928):  "Increasing Returns and Economic Progress", The Economic Journal, 152: 527-542.30
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
This appendix first solves for the corner solutions and corner equilibria in market structures A, P, and C
in static Walrasian model specified in section 2.
(1) The decision problem for configuration or structure A is





The maximum value of u for autarky is





(2) Market structure P(xy) consisting of configurations (x/y) and (y/x).
(2.a) The decision problem for configuration (x/y) is








where we have used the production functions x+x
s = lx
a and z = lz
g = (1-lx)
g, the budget constraint pxx
s
= pyy
d, and the fact that x
d = ly = y = y
s = z
s = z
d = 0 for configuration (x/y).  The solution to (A2) is









where ux(px,py) is the indirect utility function for a specialist of x.
(2.b) The corner solution for configuration (y/x) is symmetric to one for (x/y), given by









where ui(px,py) is the indirect utility function for a person selling good i.
(2.c) The utility equalization and market clearing conditions31
(A5) Mxx
s(px,py) = Myx
d(px,py) and ux(px,py) = uy(px,py)
give corner equilibrium in market structure P as














where uP is real income in market structure P.  Note that the market clearing condition for y is not
independent of (A5) due to Walras' law.  Corner equilibria in market structures P(xz) and P(yz) cannot be
equilibrium since utility levels in the two structures are lower than in P(xy) if a>b>g, or if the fixed
learning cost A is slightly smaller in producing x and y than in producing z, as shown by Yang [1990].
(3) Market structure C consisting of (x/yz), (y/xz), and (z/xy).
(3.a) The decision problem for configuration (x/yz) is












where we have used the production functions x+x
s = lx




endowment constraint lx = 1, and the fact that x
d = ly = y = y
s = lz = z = z
s = 0 for configuration
(x/yz).  The solution to (A7) is
(A8a) lx = 1,   x
s = 2/3, pyy
d = pzz
d = pxx




(3.b) The corner solutions for configurations (y/xz) and (z/xy), symmetric to the one for (x/yz),
are given by
(A8b) ly = 1,   y
s = 2/3, pxx
d = pzz
d = pyy




(A8c) lz = 1,   z
s = 2/3, pxx
d = pyy
d = pzz




where ui(px,py,pz) is the indirect utility function for a person selling good i in market structure C.
(3.c) The utility equalization and market clearing conditions








give corner equilibrium in market structure C as
(A10) px/py = pz/py = 1, Mx/My = Mz/My = 1, and uC = k
2/3
3
where uC is real income in market structure C.  Note that the market clearing condition for z is not
independent of (A9).
All information about the three corner equilibria is summarized in the following table.
Table 2: Three Corner Equilibria























C px/py=pz/py=1, Mx/My=Mz/My=1 k
2/3
3
Appendix B:  Solution of the Dynamic Programming Problem and Sequential Equilibrium
This appendix provides technical details of the solution of the dynamic programming problem in section 3
and proof of results in Tables 2 and 3.  According to the Bellman optimality principle, we use a backward
decision rule to solve for the dynamic programming problem (4).  Consider three nodes in period 1, A, P,
C.  At node A, there are seven options:  AA, AP, AC, PC, PO, CP, CO where AP is symmetric to AC,
PC symmetric to CP, PO symmetric to CO except that those sequences which experiment with C before P
involve a slightly greater pricing cost.  We need to consider only four of them, AA, AP, PC, and PO.
Using the information about payoffs for each option in each period, given in Figure 2 and equation (4),
we can compare the expected accumulated discounted real income from period 2 to period 3 for the four
options.  We denote the expected discounted utility accumulated after experiment pattern ij is chosen in33
period 1 by U(ij) where i,j=A,P,C,O; A means autarky, P means the experiment with structure P and the
better between A and P being chosen, C means that experiment with structure C and the best among A, P,
and C being chosen, and O means no new experiment and staying with the best among structures
previously experimented with.  Also the maximum value of U(ij) with respect to all possible pattern ij's
that is generated by option r in period t is denoted by Vt(r).  Using the notations, the result of this
comparison yields
￿ U(PC) if s>s5 ,
￿
￿
(B1)       V1(A) = ￿ U(PO) if s˛(s4,s5)
￿
￿
￿ U(AA) if s<s4
Similarly, for node P in period 1, we can find
￿ U(CO) if s>s1,
￿
(B2)       V1(P) = ￿
￿
￿ U(OO) if s<s1.
where s1”[uA+(2-r)b/3]/(uA+b), s4”[uA-(2rb/3)]/(uA+2b/3), s5”[uA+(2b/3)]/(uA+b)>s4 and values of
U(ij) are listed in Table 2. It can be shown that at node A in period 1 AP cannot be part of equilibrium. A
comparison between U(AP) and U(AA) and between U(PO) and U(AP) indicates that U(PO)>U(AP) iff
s>s6”[uA(1-r)-2br/3]/(1+r)(uA+2b/3) and U(AA) >U(AP) iff s<s7”uA/(uA+2b/3) where s7>s6 which
implies that U(AP) is either smaller than U(AP) or smaller than U(PO). Hence, AP will never be chosen.
At node P it can be shown that OC cannot be equilibrium. A comparison between U(CO) and U(OC) and
between U(OO) and U(OC) indicates that U(CO)>U(OC) iff s>s8”[uA+(2/3-r)b/(1-r)]/(uA+b) and
U(OO)>U(OC) iff s<s5 where s5>s8 which implies that U(OC) is either smaller than U(OO) or smaller
than U(CO). Hence, OC will never be chosen at node P in period 1.
Node C in period 1 is symmetric to node P except that all experiment patterns at node C involves
slightly greater discounted pricing cost than those which start from node P.34
Table 3: Total Discounted Utilities for Different Experiment Patterns Starting from Period 1
Node Structure
sequence ij











where utility is discounted to period 1.
We denote the expected discounted utility accumulated after experiment pattern ijr is chosen in
period 0 by U(ijr) where i,j,r=A,P,C,O, and A,P,C,O have the same meanings as for the notations for
the problem in period 1.  Using the information about payoffs in period 0, given in Fig. 2, equation (4),
(B1), and (B2), we obtain the final solution of the dynamic programming problem as follows.
(B3) ￿ s(uA+2b/3)+V1(P)=s(uA+2b/3)+U(CO)=U(PCO) if s>s1,
￿
￿




￿ uA+V1(A)=uA+U(AA)=U(AAA) if s<s0.
where the values of si are given in Table 5.35
Table 4: Total Discounted Utilities for Different Experiment Patterns Starting from Period 0
Structure
sequence ijr








where POC is excluded due to (B2).
Table 5: Values of si














where s1>s0, s5>s4, s5>s8, s5>s9, s7>s6, and s10>s4.36
Note that Vt(i) changes with the value ranges of s even if t and i are fixed. For establishing
(B3), we firs show that sequences APC and APO cannot be equilibrium. To show that APC cannot be
equilibrium, compare U(PCO) with U(APC) which are given in Table 4. The comparison yields
(B4) U(PCO)>U(APC) iff s>s9”[uA-r
2b/(1-r)]/{uA+[2+r/(1-r
2)]b/3}
A comparison between s9 and s5 indicates that s9<s5. This implies that U(PCO)>U(APC) if s>s9 and
U(POO)>U(APC) if s<s5 where s9<s5. In other words U(APC) is either smaller than U(PCO) or
smaller than U(POO), so that APC will never be chosen.
To show that APO cannot be equilibrium, we compare U(AAA), U(APO), and U(POO),
given in Table 4. The comparison yields
(B5) U(POO)>U(APO) iff s>s10”[uA-2rb/3(1-r)]/[uA+(2b/3)]
U(APO)>U(AAA) iff s>s4
where s4<s10 which implies that U(APO) is either smaller than U(POO) or smaller than U(AAA), so that
APO will never be chosen. (B4) and (B5) narrow down the set of candidates for the solution. Hence, we
need consider only AAA, POO, and PCO. A comparison between U(AAA), U(POO), and U(PCO),
given in Table 4, yields the solution in Table 1.
Now let us establish the results in Figure 3. From Table 1, it is straightforward that AAAA
will be chosen as a pattern of experimentation sequence if s<s0. This implies that no structure with trade
will be experimented with and updated information for any t>0 is the same as prior information in period
0. Individuals will not acquire information and their new decisions adjusted according to updated
information is the same as one in period 0. Hence, AAAA is the sequential equilibrium. Table 1 indicates
that structure P will be experimented with in period 1 if s>s0. Updated information in period 1 depends
on values of the parameters of transactions, production, and tastes. For k2>k1, then uA>uP, uC if k<k1;
uP>uA, uC if k˛(k1,k2); and uC>uP, uA if k>k2. Suppose k<k1. Then an individual's updated
information in period 1 according to the Bayes rule is as follows. He knows values of uA and uP and that37
uA>uP. He can use the Bayes rule to calculate that ranking uAuPuC occurs with probability 1/3; ranking
uAuCuP occurs with probability 1/3; and ranking uCuAuP occurs with probability 1/3.  On the basis of the
updated information, his dynamic programming problem from period 1 to period 3 is specified as follows.
(B6a) E1(su2+ru3)=(2/3)(suA+ruA)+(1/3)(s+r)(uA+b)
if he tries C in period 2 and chooses the optimum between A and C.
(B6b) E1(u2+ru3)=(1+r)uA if he does not try C.
where pricing cost 1-s is incurred in period 1 and an information gain associated with b is received if he
tries C. He will try C iff (B4a) is greater than (B6b). A comparison between (B6a) and (B6b) yields
(B7) Structure C will be experimented with in period 2 if s>s2”(uA-br/3)/(uA+b/3).
Since uA>uP, uC if k<k1, (B7), together with Table 1, implies that the experimentation sequence is
APAA but AAAA will be finally chosen if s˛(s0,s2) and the experimentation sequence is APCA but
AAAA will be finally chosen if s>s2, provided k<k1.
Suppose k˛(k1,k2) and s>s0 where k2>k1. For s0>s3, we have s>s0>s3. Following similar
reasoning for establishing (B7), (B8) can be proven.
(B8) Structure C will be experimented with in period 2 if s>s3.
Since uP>uA, uC if k˛(k1,k2), (B8), together with Table 1, implies that the experimentation sequence is
APCP and thereby APPP will be finally chosen if s>s0>s3.
If s0<s3, then we have to consider both cases of s˛(s0,s3) and s>s3. For s˛(s0,s3), C will not
be experimented with in period 2. Therefore, APPP is the sequential equilibrium. For s>s3, (B6) holds,
so that the experimentation pattern is APCP and the sequence APPP will be finally chosen.
Repeating the lines of deduction, all other results in Fig. 3 can be established.